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In National League of Cities v. Usery,I the Supreme Court held
that Congress exceeds its power under the commerce clause if it enacts
legislation directed at functions essential to state sovereignty, because
the tenth amendment2 reserves to the states plenary authority to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.3 The Usery decision, which, according to Justice Brennan,
must have astounded scholars of the Constitution,4 seemed initially to
be the harbinger of a new era of federalism in which the states would
be afforded increased freedom in managing their own affairs. Eight
years later, however, in March of 1983, the Supreme Court severely
restricted the scope of the Usery doctrine. It held in EEOC v.
Wyoming, 5 that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act6 (ADEA)
as applied to the states did not violate the tenth amendment. Justice
Stevens suggested in his concurrence that Usery be "placed in the same
category as E. C. Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, and Carter v. Carter
Coal-cases whose subsequent rejection is now universally regarded as
proper."'7
This note analyzes the tenth amendment doctrine that has
emerged since the Court's decision in Usery. It argues that EEOC v.
Wyoming did not overrule Usery, but is consistent with a method of
analysis that the Court has developed in cases since Usery and that was
implicit in that opinion. Part I of the note discusses Usery and
demonstrates that the case contains not one but two tests for
determining whether an act of Congress infringes on the powers
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
3. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
4. Id at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 (1983).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
7. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing United States v. E.
C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)).
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reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. 8 The first test, which
appears in Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, provides that any
infringement, no matter how minimal, upon a traditional state function
essential to state sovereignty violates the tenth amendment. 9 Justice
Blackmun provided the second test in a brief concurring opinion. He
advocated a weighing of federal and state concerns to determine
whether federal legislation should give way to a state's tenth
amendment claims. 10
Part II of the note examines Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation AssociationI I and FERC v. Mississippi,t2 Supreme Court
cases that arose after Usery and presented tenth amendment
questions.13 The note analyzes these cases and argues that they
illustrate the Court's retreat from Justice Rehnquist's rigid per se test in
Usery and its adoption of Justice Blackmun's balancing approach.
Part III discusses EEOC v. Wyoming. 14 It argues that because the
Court considered the degree of impairment of an essential state
function relevant to its determination of whether the ADEA was
constitutional, the Court was actually using Justice Blackmun's
balancing test. This interpretation suggests that, although the Court's
acceptance of the balancing approach restricts the scope of the tenth
amendment as understood by Justice Rehnquist, the heart of the Usery
holding, that state sovereignty circumscribes the enumerated powers of
the federal government, has survived and may be invoked in future
cases, despite vehement criticism of the Usery holding by Justices
Brennan and Stevens. 15
I. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v USERY: REVITALIZING THE
TENTH AMENDMENT
Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court attached little significance to the
tenth amendment.' 6 The Court read the amendment as providing only
that those powers not delegated to the federal government were to be
8. See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
9. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
10. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
11. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
12. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
13. See infra notes 34-61 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 64-92 and accompanying text.
15. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting); EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at
1067 (Stevens, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 96 (1824) (holding that the tenth
amendment does not limit congressional exercise of enumerated powers); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-07 (1819) (same); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.)
304, 322-24 (1816) (same).
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exercised by the states. The Court, in United States v. Darby,17 went so
far as to describe the amendment as a "truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered." Under this view, states Could not employ
the tenth amendment to curtail congressional exercise of an enumer-
ated power because the amendment was understood only to parcel to
the states those powers that the Constitution had not delegated to
Congress.
The Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, how-
ever, transformed the tenth amendment into a limitation on the enu-
merated powers of Congress. In Usery, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act I8 (FLSA), which extended federal minimum-wage and maximum-
hour provisions to most state and municipal employees. Various orga-
nizations of states and municipalities had argued that, although the
commerce clause empowered Congress to enact the amendments, they
were nonetheless invalid because they intruded on the powers reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment. These organizations noted that
the Court had previously held that congressional "enactments which
may be fully within the grant of legislative authority contained in the
Commerce Clause may nonetheless be found to offend against the right
to trial by jury contained in the Sixth Amendment."19
17. 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
18. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), requires employers
covered by the Act to pay their employees a minimum hourly wage and to pay them at the rate of
one and one-half times their regular pay for hours worked in excess of 40 during a workweek. For
a history of the Act, see Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 185-87 (1968). As originally enacted, the
Act expressly excluded states from its coverage: "'Employer' includes any person acting directly
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision of a State ...." The Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060, 1060. Congress amended the Act in 1966
expressly to include within its coverage "employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof,
employed . . . in a hospital, institution or school." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). The Supreme
Court subsequently concluded that Congress did not intend by this amendment to exercise its
power under the commerce clause to lift the states' eleventh amendment immunity against suit in
a federal forum. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Missouri, 411 U.S. 279, 285
(1973). In response to the Court's decision that the 1966 amendment did not subject the states to
suit in federal court, Congress the next year expressly included states within the scope of the Act
by amending the term "employer" to include "public agency." 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). The Court
did not reconsider the eleventh amendment issue in Usery, because it invalidated the 1974 amend-
ments on tenth amendment grounds. See Redish, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES COMMENTS & QUES-
TIONS 554 (1983).
19. Usery, 426 U.S. at 841. It is interesting to note that the political subdivisions of the states
which brought suit in Usery may claim the shelter of the tenth amendment, but not of the eleventh
amendment. Cf. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (a county is not part of a
state for the purposes of the eleventh amendment). For a critical discussion of the dichotomy, see
generally Note, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political Subdivisions ofthe States:
An Unjustfied Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042.
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The Supreme Court held that the 1974 amendments were uncon-
stitutional, but did so on slightly different grounds than the appellants
had suggested. It held that Congress was without power under the
commerce clause to enact legislation that would "displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions, ' 20 or would threaten a "State's 'ability to function
effectively in a federal system.'"21 It concluded that, because the
amendments to the FLSA threatened state autonomy, they violated the
tenth amendment.22 The Court transformed the tenth amendment
from a superfluity into an affirmative limitation on Congress's broad
powers.
Although the Court made it clear that it read the tenth amendment
as commanding that delegated powers may not be exercised so as to
"override state sovereignty, '23 the opinion contains many ambiguities.
First, the Court determined that, to ensure protection of state sover-
eignty, no federal legislation could impinge upon an "essential state
function."2 4 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, provided no
framework for identifying such essential state functions.25 Instead he
offered a concededly incomplete list of functions, including fire and po-
lice protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.26
20. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
21. Id (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1974)).
22. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842.
23. Id at 845.
24. Id
25. A great deal of legal commentary focused on the ambiguity embedded in the phase. See,
e.g., Kilbert & Fort, National League of Cities v. Usery." Its Meaning andImpact, 45 Grto. WASH.
L. REV. 613, 615 n.23 (1977); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux. Intergov-
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 808-09 (1982);
Lopach, The New Federalism of the Supreme Court.- Diminished Expectations of National League
of Cities, 43 MONT. L. REV. 181, 185 (1982); Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Foot-
note to Holding-State Immunityfrom Commerce Clause Regulation, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 73
(1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism andAffirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1104 (1977); see also Note, National
League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff Balancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEO. L.J. 827,
829 (1980); Note, The Constitutional Limitations Upon Federal Regulation of Municipal Issuers, 51
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 565, 580 (1977); Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: Its Implicationsfor
the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 10 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 239, 249
(1977); Note, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments The Effect of National
League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 674 (1977).
26. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851. The ambiguity created by this lack of precision is reflected in
conflicting lower court applications of the doctrine. See, e.g., Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit
Auth., 677 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1982) (public bus operations are not a traditional state function);
Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 669 F.2d 671, 680 (11th Cir. 1982) (mental health
centers are not integral state functions) (dictum); United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety,
635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th Cir. 1980) (motor vehicle licensing is not a traditional state function);
District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (regulating inspection and main-
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The Usery opinion is flawed by a second, more fundamental ambi-
guity. Even given the existence of a universally accepted, traditional
state function,27 the opinion does not clarify when the Court would find
that federal legislation improperly infringes on such state functions.
Justice Rehnquist proposed a de minimis standard. According to his
approach, once the Court identified a traditional state function essen-
tial to state sovereignty, any infringement on that function would be
impermissible.28 Justice Rehnquist considered both the degree of in-
fringement and the federal government's reasons for the regulation to
tenance of motor vehicles is a traditional state function); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y., 445 F.2d
1150, 1156-57 (2d Cir. 1971) (legal aid to poor may be an essential state function, but regulations
involved did not affect such a function); San Antonio Metro. Transit Ass'n v. Donovan, 557 F.
Supp. 445, 453-54 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (public bus operations are traditional state functions). San
Antonio may provide the opportunity for another tenth amendment decision. The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983), and the case has been set for reargument in the
1984 Term. See also South Dakota v. Adams, 506 F. Supp. 50, 56 (C.D.S.D. 1980) (billboard
regulation not a traditional state function); Jordan v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13, 18-19 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (decision to operate state-run stores for prison inmates is a traditional state function).
In Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979), the court held that
the operation of a municipally owned airport is a traditional state function. Noting that Usery
provided no guidelines for determining a traditional state function, the court addressed four
criteria:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is available
to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity is undertaken for the
purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain; (3) government is the principal
provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide
the service or perform the activity because of a community wide need for the service or
activity.
Id at 1037. For the view that these four criteria extend far beyond the rationale of Usery and
could lead to an erosion of Congress's power to legislate under the commerce power, see Note,
National League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff. Balancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEO.
L.J. 827, 849 (1980).
27. A clarification of these terms may possibly be gleaned by analogy from the traditional
and nontraditional distinctions made by the Court in tax cases. Even in these cases, however,
where the state seeks immunity from a federal tax, the traditional state function doctrine is inade-
quately defined. See Kilberg & Fort, supra note 25, at 615 n.23 (noting that the operation of
liquor dispensaries by a state was held to be a nontraditional state function in South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905), but that cotton ginning has been held to be a traditional
state function, Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 519 (1929)).
28. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. Applying this standard to the facts of Usery, Justice Rehnquist
stated:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages
which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental
functions, what hours those persons will work, and what compensation will be provided
where these employees may be called upon to work overtime. The question we must
resolve here, then, is whether these determinations are "functions essential to separate
and independent existence," so that Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise
plenary authority to make them.
Id at 845-46 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)).
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be constitutionally irrelevant.29 Thus, the Usery Court stressed that
"[w]e do not believe particularized assessments of actual impact are
crucial to resolution of the issue presented .,,s
Justice Blackmun, although joining the majority opinion, filed a
brief concurring opinion that suggested a much different analysis. He
proposed a balancing approach that seemed to require courts to con-
sider the degree of infringement of state sovereignty and the impor-
tance of the federal interest in their determination of tenth-amendment
violations.3' Justice Blackmun's approach would not "outlaw federal
power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal in-
terest is demonstrably greater [than the state's] and where state facility
compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 32 Jus-
tice Blackmun did not explain how his balancing approach applied to
the facts in Usery. It may be presumed that he concurred in the Court's
holding that the FLSA amendments offended the tenth amendment be-
cause he had balanced Congress's federal interest in extending FLSA
coverage to state government employees against the states's interest in
setting the wages for state employees, and found that the state interest
should prevail.
Thus, Usery presented lower courts with two conflicting ap-
proaches for analyzing whether the tenth amendment invalidated fed-
eral legislation. The ensuing confusion prompted one district court
judge to comment that, because "Justice Blackmun's concurrence was
the swing vote in the ultimate holding. . , it is impossible to discern
what test, if any, was established for analyzing congressional exercises
of power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. '33
29. Justice Rehnquist did agree, however, that in certain instances federal concerns were con-
stitutionally relevant. For instance, in national emergencies, the tenth amendment would give
way to "temporary enactments tailored to combat [such emergencies]." Id at 853.
30. Id at 851.
31. Id at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. Id.
33. Tennessee v. Louisville & N. R.R., 478 F. Supp. 199, 206 (M.D. Tex. 1979). This diffi-
culty was shared by other lower courts. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033,
1037 (6th Cir. 1979) (searching only for impairment of essential state function); cf. United States
v. Ohio Dep't of Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th Cir. 1980) (balancing federal interest in control-
ling air pollution with state's interest in permitting non-complying vehicles to use public streets
and highways in upholding Clean Air Act); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir.
1979) (same); see also Lopach, supra note 25, at 185-86.
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FEDERAL INTEREST: THE COURT'S
ADOPTION OF THE FIRST PRONG OF THE BALANCING
APPROACH
Given the revolutionary nature of Usery, it is not surprising that
the Supreme Court found it necessary to revise its relatively ambiguous
test in two major cases decided prior to EEOC v. Wyoming. These
cases suggest that Justice Blackmun's analysis of the strength of the
federal interest and the degree of infringement of state interests have
become the Court's preferred view. In Virginia Surface Mining34 and
FERC v. Mississippi,35 the Supreme Court considered the importance
of the asserted federal concerns in its decision-a consideration that
Justice Rehnquist had not deemed relevant in Usery.
A. Formulating an Irrebutable Presumption: Virginia Surface
Mining.
In its 1981 decision in Virginia Surface Mining,36 the Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977. 37 Certain Virginia coal producers and
landowners38 challenged the Act's performance standards, which di-
rected the Secretary of Interior to promulgate regulations establishing
an interim regulatory program for surface coal mining.39 The Act re-
quired any state wishing to assume permanent regulatory authority
over surface coal mining projects to submit a proposal to the Secretary
for his approval.40 In its proposal, the state was obligated to demon-
34. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
35. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
36. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
37. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982)
The Surface Mining Act is designed to "establish a nationwide program to protect society and
the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations." 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a)
(1982). It establishes a two-stage program for regulation, an interim regulating phase, and a per-
manent phase. 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). The interim phase requires immediate promulgation and
federal enforcement of several of the Act's environmental protection performance standards.
Under the permanent program, regulations are to be adopted for each state, requiring compliance
with federal performance standards, with enforcement responsibility lying with either the state or
federal government.
Regulations promulgated by the Secretary establishing the interim regulatory program gov-
ern such areas as: (a) restoration of land after mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land
to its approximate original contour, (c) segregation and preservation of topsoil; (d) minimization
of disturbance to the hydrologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles used as dams
and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined areas; and (g) soil disposal. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)
(1982).
38. Plaintiffs consisted of individual landowners, an association of coal-mining operators,
local mining companies, a town, and the Commonwealth of Virginia.
39. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 273.
40. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982); see also Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 270-72.
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strate that its legislature had enacted laws that implemented the envi-
ronmental-protection standards provided in the Act.41 If a state failed
to create or to enforce an acceptable program, it would become subject
to a permanent federal program which the Secretary of Interior would
develop and implement.42 In short, the Act required states to adopt
regulations governing surface coal mining that were consistent with
federal environmental policy, or face automatic preemption by federal
law.
The coal producers and landowners challenged the Surface Min-
ing Act on tenth amendment grounds.43 In deciding the tenth amend-
ment question, the Supreme Court relied on a three-part test that it
found implicit in Usery. The Court would consider federal legislation
unconstitutional if: 1) it regulates a state as a state;44 2) it addresses
"matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty' "; and 3)
enforcement of the statute would directly impair a state's ability to
"'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' "4 The Court found the Act constitutional because it was
directed at controlling the activity ofprivate coal miners and thus did
not constitute regulation of a state as a state.46 Therefore, the Court
did not proceed to the other elements of the three-part test.
In developing this test the Court restricted the potential scope of
the Usery analysis. By requiring that the statute regulate the state as a
state, the Court insulated from tenth-amendment attack federal legisla-
41. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (1982).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982).
43. The district court, relying on Usery, held that the Act violated the tenth amendment.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980).
In so doing the court focused on whether the federal legislation infringed on a "traditional state
function." Although Congress was regulating a private industry, the court found that the "power
to adopt and enforce laws affecting the use of private, nonfederal land has traditionally and histor-
ically been within the police powers of the respective states." Id at 433. Because the Act would
displace the state's ability to make "essential decisions" in this area, id, the court held that the act
improperly invaded areas of traditional governmental functions. Accord, Indiana v. Andrus, 501
F. Supp. 452, 464-65 (S.D. Ind. 1980),rep'dsub nom. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 317 (1980).
44. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 287. The Court's opinion in User), contains dicta to
the effect that statutes regulating the states as states are more intrusive of the sovereignty of the
states than legislation that merely preempts state regulation over the private sector, 426 U.S. at
840, 844-45. Whether intentional or not, however, the Court did not establish a per se rule that
legislation regulating private activity was beyond the scope of the tenth amendment. Thus, the
requirement that a statute regulate a state as a state recited in Virginia Surface Mining constitutes a
restriction upon a possible broad reading of Usery.
45. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting Usery, 426 U.S. at 852). The Court
actually added a fourth part to the test when it noted that there "are situations in which the nature
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission." 452 U.S. at 288
n.29.
46. Id at 288.
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tion which regulated the private sector. It appeared to assume that the
power of a state to regulate the private sector is never so important to
that state as to be essential to its sovereignty. Yet this is a questionable
assumption. As Professor Tribe has noted, although the provision of
basic services is an important state function, "no less essential is the
function of defining the scope of permissible conduct within a state's or
municipality's borders through regulations aimed at private parties. '47
It is thus somewhat surprising that the Court took such a narrow view
of a state's essential functions. A likely explanation is that the Court, in
fashioning its three-part test, had begun to employ Justice Blackmun's
balancing test. The Court appeared to be concerned with the conse-
quences that classifying regulation of the private sectior as an essential
state function would have on the federal government's ability to fulfill
its legislative functions. If the tenth amendment were to protect from
federal preemption all state regulation of the private sector, it would
interfere with a host of federal statutes that the Court has long consid-
ered to be legitimate exercise of Congress's article I powers. This re-
sult, the Court noted, would be at odds with well-established precedent
surrounding the supremacy clause.4 Had the Court chosen to use Jus-
tice Rehnquist's approach from Usery, it would not have used the first
prong of its three-part test in Virginia Surface Mining. It would have
considered only whether the state regulation of the private sector was
an essential state function and, if so, whether the federal statute im-
paired the exercise of that function.
Instead, in Virginia Surface Mining, the Court engaged in a bal-
ancing approach; it looked at the general federal interest underlying
the supremacy clause and balanced this against the state interest in reg-
ulating private entities. By adopting the first prong of its three-part
test, the Court indicated that, in cases where Congress sought to regu-
late private parties, Congress's interest in ensuring the vitality of the
supremacy clause is so compelling that it would always outweigh a
47. Tribe, supra note 25, at 1074-75. This is the approach that was taken in the lower court.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 433 (W.D. Va. 1980).
48. The Court noted that:
A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to displace or pre-empt state
laws regulating private activity affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict
with federal law. . . .Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or pro-
hibit the States' prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States
may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.
Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 290.
In response, one might argue in light of Usery that because the tenth amendment is viewed as
an affirmative limitation on Congress's enumerated powers, the fact that an area of regulation is
protected under the tenth amendment renders the congressional legislation unconstitutional; the
supremacy clause thus is in no way affected. See id
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state's tenth amendment claim. The Court, in essence, adopted a per se
rule, protecting federal legislation from tenth amendment challenges in
cases involving regulation of the private sector.49
B. Implicit Recognition of a Federal Interest: FERC v. Mississippi.
The Court's 1982 decision in FERC P. Mississippi50 further but-
tresses the argument that the Court has adopted Justice Blackmun's
balancing approach in its analysis of tenth amendment cases. In FERC
v. Mississoppi, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Public Util-
ity Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).5t Like the legislation in
Virginia Surface Mining, this Act presented the states with the choice of
adopting federal proposals or facing federal preemption.5 2 PURPA,
49. As a practical matter, the Court has always recognized the federal government's interest
in uniformity in certain mining regulations. See id. at 268; see also Abrams, The Federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of/1977-First to Survive a Tenth Amendment Attack, 84 VA.
L. REv. 1069, 1070-76 (1981). Justice Blackmun in Usery had noted the importance of uniformity
in the area of environmental regulations. He considered this the type of federal concern that
should justify certain inroads into state sovereignty. Usery, 426 U.S. at 826 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
50. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
51. Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (1982)) [hereinafter
cited as PURPA]. The Act was signed into law on November 9, 1978 by President Carter. It was
one of several pieces of legislation passed on the same day tailored to combat the nationwide
energy crisis. They included the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174, (codified
at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1982)), the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8226 (1982)), the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483
(1982)), and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717-719, 3301-3416 (1982)).
Congress enacted the PURPA using its authority under the commerce clause. Congress
found that electric utilities were burdened with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency due in
part to their reliance on oil and gas, and that this had a negative effect on rates to customers and
on the economy as a whole. S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1977). Congress determined
that conservation by electric utilities of oil and gas was necessary to reduce the country's depen-
dence on foreign oil, to avoid a shortage of natural gas, and to control consumer costs.
52. Title I of PURPA requires each state regulatory authority to consider federal retail elec-
tric power rate standards, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-2627 (1982), and authorizes the Secretary, any af-
fected electric utility, or any electric consumer of an affected electric utility, to intervene as a
matter of right in any ratemaking proceeding conducted by a state regulatory authority. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 2631-2634 (1982). Title II authorizes the FERC to order interconnection between small power
producers, cogenerators and other utilities, 16 U.S.C. § 824i (1982), order "wheeling" between
utilities, 16 U.S.C. § 824j (1982), and exempt electric utilities from any provision of state law, state
rule, or regulation that prevents voluntary coordination of electric utilities where such voluntary
coordination is designed to acquire economic utilization of facilities and resources in any area. 16
U.S.C. § 824a(l) (1982). Title II further requires the FERC to promulgate rules designed to en-
sure continuity of service to customers of public utilities, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(9) (1982), and to pro-
duce electric utility reliability standards, 16 U.S.C. § 824a(2) (1982). The Act also created or
revised federal regulatory authority over natural gas utilities, 16 U.S.C. § 2701 (1982), and crude
oil transportation systems. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2005-2012 (Supp. IIl 1979). For an in-depth analysis of
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however, went "one step beyond"53 the surface mining legislation con-
sidered in Virginia Surface Mining in that the public utilities law pro-
vided procedural rules which the states were to follow in considering
the federal proposals.5 4
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that, because
Congress could have preempted the field, at least in the area of private
rather than state activity, "PURPA should not be invalid simply be-
cause, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less in-
trusive scheme. . . -55 Justice Blackmun also noted that no state was
compelled to act; states could avoid the impositions of PURPA merely
by ceasing to regulate public utilities.5 6 Because the state voluntarily
took up public utilities regulation, there was, in the Court's view, no
room to assert a tenth amendment claim.57
the Act, see generally Note, The Constitutionality and Effectiveness of the Electric Utility Provisions
ofthe Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 787 (1979).
53. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 764.
54. The agency must prepare its regulation after public notice and a hearing, and its final
determinations must be in writing, based upon evidence presented at the hearing and available to
the public, 16 U.S.C. §§ 111, 2621(b)-(c) (1982). To avoid placing a financial burden on the states,
the Secretary of Energy is authorized to make grants to state regulatory authorities to assist them
in carrying out the procedural provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 6807 (Supp. III 1979).
55. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 765. The motives of Congress, however, may not be as
pristine as the Court suggests. By employing state institutions to advance federal policy, Congress
may be fashioning a compromise where majority support for total preemption in the field is
lacking.
56. Id at 765-66.
57. Id at 769-70. Justice O'Connor, writing in dissent, criticized the majority's emphasis on
a state's "choice" in determining tenth amendment violations. She asserted that "under the
Court's analysis. . . National League of Cities v. Usery. . . would have been wrongly decided,
because the States could have avoided the Fair Labor Standards Act by 'choosing' to fire all
employees subject to that Act, and to close those branches of state government." Id. at 781-82
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). This conclusion, however, is not supported by the
Court's analysis. The "choice" that the majority has found permissible is created when the federal
government indirectly coerces the state by threatening preemption in a field constitutionally
preemptible, in an effort to affect certain state functions that Congress could not reach through
direct legislation because of the tenth amendment. Justice O'Connor's suggestion that, under the
majority's analysis, the existence of a state choice rescues even direct legislation affecting protected
state functions from tenth amendment infringement goes well beyond Justice Blackmun's
assertion.
The decision conflicted with the approach of the Court in Usery, Justice O'Connor
maintained:
The Court, however, does not explain why our National League ofCities opinion did not
consider compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act in fields such as "licensing of
occupations and businesses,. . . preservation of environmental quality,. . . [and] pro-
tection of the public against fraud and sharp practice," a "conditio[n] on the State's regu-
lation of private conduct in a pre-emptible area." In that case, Congress had required
the States to pay their employees specified amounts if they wished to continue regulating
a variety of pre-emptible fields.
Id., at 782 n.9 (O'Connor J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Appellant at 16, National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
DUKE LAW JOU[V8AL
Taken at face value, the Court's assertion that the existence of
state choice insulated federal legislation from tenth amendment attack
is not satisfactory. The Court recognized that the ability of a state leg-
islative body to consider and promulgate regulations of its own choos-
ing is a central element of state sovereignty.58 Furthermore, it
acknowledged that a state would probably find it difficult to abandon
its regulatory role.5 9 The Court conceded that, as a practical matter,
the state had been forced to acquiesce in the federal government's in-
fringement of its sovereignty. The Court, however, denied that such
practical necessities have any constitutional relevance: "Thus it cannot
be constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to
move the States to act in a given way, or even to 'coerc[e] the States'
into assuming a regulatory role by affecting their 'freedom to make de-
cisions in areas of integral state functions.' 60
This "consent" approach is even more troubling because the Court
did not define the required nexus between the field which is preempted
and the acts which Congress desires the states to perform. In FEAC v.
Mississipi, Congress preempted the field that it sought to regulate.
But FEWRC v. Mississppi does not limit the scope of its holding to sub-
jects where Congress could preempt the field. For instance, under a
literal interpretation of the holding, Congress could have conditioned
nonpreemption of the regulatory field of public utilities upon a state's
enacting a statute bringing police and firemen under the FLSA. It
would have preempted a field over which it had authority to do so and
The difficulty with this view is that Usery is not parallel to FERC v. Mississiopi. In Usery', the
protected state function was not the employer-employee relationship as such, but rather only rela-
tionships in certain essential state functions. See National League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F.
Supp. 703, 704-06 (D.D.C. 1977). It could be assumed that where the federal government could
constilutionally preempt a field previously regulated by the state, such a state function could not
be essential and thus the employer-employee relationship in that field would not be subject to the
Usery holding. If this is so, then Justice O'Connor's use of Usery should not be viewed as support
for the proposition that before FERC v. Mississippi the Court would have held impermissible a
threat by Congress of federal preemption in an attempt to affect a state function protected by the
tenth amendment.
Although not inconsistent with the holding of Usery, FERC v. Mississippi does appear to
intrude upon the spirit of the doctrine. As the example in the text seeks to illustrate, if taken
literally and without qualification, the majority analysis, while upholding the Usery decision, di-
rects Congress to a back door through which all of the protection bestowed upon the states by
Usery can be removed while leaving the decision intact. This procedure would parallel the
Court's analysis of the spending power, in which the Court has held that the power was independ-
ent and not restricted by Congess's other enumerated powers and could therefore be used to co-
erce states to perform in ways that Congress could not directly legislate. See United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1966).
58. FERC v. Mississppi, 456 U.S. at 761.
59. Id at 766.
60. Id. (quoting Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 289).
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it would have given the states the choice whether to take action. In
short, the consent theory, if taken to its logical extreme, would create a
substantial gap in the Usery rationale.
That Justice Blackmun, the author of FERC v. Mississppi, pro-
vided the crucial fifth vote in the Usery decision suggests that FERC v.
Mississoppi should not be read as abandoning the concerns for state
sovereignty that led to the decision in Usery. Instead, the "consent"
theory should be understood to apply within the parameters of Justice
Blackmun's "balancing approach" in Usery. That is, the consent ap-
proach is more likely to be applied when the federal interest is strong
and the state interest weak than when the state interest is strong and the
federal interest weak. In FERC v. Mississippi, for instance, the Court
viewed the problem addressed by PURPA as an important federal con-
cern that required uniform behavior on the part of all energy produ-
cers.61 This important federal concern outweighed the state's interest
in regulating private energy producers and avoiding the procedural re-
straints imposed by PURPA. Thus, the Court developed the consent
approach to avoid potential tenth-amendment problems and intended
it to apply only when the federal government has a strong interest in
regulating particular fields.
III. EEOC v. WYOMING: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RELEVANCE OF
THE DEGREE OF IMPAIRMENT OF STATE FUNCTIONS
Underlying Virginia Surface Mining and FERC v. Mississippi were
concerns about the potential of the tenth amendment being used as ve-
hicle to uphold confficting state laws in areas where Congress, in the
Court's view, had a legitimate right to regulate. In both cases, the
Court implicitly weighed federal and state interests. This analysis dif-
fered substantially from that suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Usery62
and resembled the balancing approach outlined by Justice Blackmun in
his Usery concurring opinion.63 The decision in EEOC v. Wyoming 64
brought the Court yet closer to Justice Blackmun's "balancing ap-
proach." The Court not only compared the federal and state interests,
but also considered the degree to which federal legislation infringed on
state sovereignty, a characteristic that Justice Relmquist's approach in
Usery dismissed as irrelevant.
61. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 745.
62. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
64. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
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A. The Court's Decision.
The case arose when the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) brought suit against the State of Wyoming for viola-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).65
Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee on the basis of age.66 In 1974, Congress had
amended the Act to extend the definition of "employer" to include state
and local governments. 67 The Wyoming statute in question provided a
mandatory retirement age for all game and fish wardens.68 Attorneys
for the state argued that the 1974 amendments extending the Act to
state employees violated the tenth amendment. They claimed that a
state's relationship with its park and recreation employees was an es-
65. 29 U.S.C. § 621-624 (1982). The Wyoming Game and Fish Department, pursuant to a
state statute, had forced a District Game Division supervisor to retire. The supervisor filed a
complaint with the EEOC claiming that the state had violated the ADEA. The Commission then
filed suit in the District Court for the District of Wyoming seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, back pay, and liquidated damages. The district court, upon defendant's motion, dismissed
the suit holding that the ADEA violated the tenth-amendment doctrine as enunciated in User), to
the extent the statute applied to state game wardens and law enforcement officials. See EEOC v,
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1059-60.
66. Congressional concern with arbitrary age discrimination throughout the 1950's and early
1960's culminated in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. The Act prohibits
various forms of age discrimination in employment such as the discharge of employees on the
basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). This protection was limited to workers between the ages
of 40 and 65, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982), until Congress expanded the upper boundary of this classifi-
cation to the age of 70. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub, L.
No. 95-256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189 (codified 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)). In recognition of the fact that
criteria related to age are justified in some circumstances, the Act provides that "where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particu-
lar business," its use in employment decision is not unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (t)(1) (1982).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
68. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, Wyo.
STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977) provides that:
a) Any employee who has four (4) or more years of service to his credit shall be
eligible to receive a retirement allowance under this act when he attains the age of fifty(50).
b) During the period from July 1, 1973, through June 30, 1977, an employee who
has twenty-five (25) or more years of service may retire when such employee reaches the
age of sixty (60) years, at the discretion of the employer, and receive a benefit as de-
scribed in [§ 31-3-110] of the statutes. An employee may retire at an earlier age, at the
discretion of the employer, provided the benefit payable at such earlier age shall be the
actuarially determined equivalent value to the benefit commencing at age sixty (60). Af-
ter June 30, 1977, an employee with twenty-five (25) or more years of service may elect to
retire and receive a benefit upon attaining the age of fifty-five (55) years as described in
[§ 31.3-110] of the statutes, or at an earler age on an actuarially determined equivalent
basis.
c) An employee may continue in service on a year-to-year basis after age sixty (60)
until June 30, 1977, and thereafter age fifty-five (55), with the approval of employer and
under conditions as the employer may proscribe.
d) Any employee in service who has attained the age of sixty-five (65) years, shall
be retired no later than the last day of the calendar month in which his 65th birthday
occurs.
[Vol. 1984:601
Vol. 1984:601] TENTH AMENDMENT B,4LANCING
sential state function with which Congress could not constitutionally
interfere.
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion for the Court, holding
the federal legislation constitutional as applied to the state. 69 The
Court applied the three-part test that it had announced in Virginia Sur-
face Mining. It found that the first requirement, that the statute regu-
late the states as states, was "plainly met."' 70 The Court, held, however,
that the third requirement was not satisfied; the ADEA did not directly
impair the states's ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions.7' The Court thus found it unnec-
essary to resolve the more difficult question of whether the federal stat-
69. The Court could have avoided the Usery doctrine altogether by finding that the ADEA
was a valid exercise of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. As the Court proclaimed in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179
(1980), Congress is not restricted by the tenth amendment constraints that circumscribe the exer-
cise of the commerce clause power when properly exercising its power under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Such an interpretation of the ADEA would hardly have been unique. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d
601, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1977); Coffin v.
South Carolina Department of Social Services, 562 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.S.C. 1983); Adams v.
James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 84 (M.D. Ala. 1981); EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F.
Supp. 1051, 1052-53 (M.D. Pa. 1980). The issue of whether the ADEA was enacted under § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment was argued by both parties. Brief for Appellant at 21-37, EEOC v.
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); Brief for Appellee at 20-29, EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983). The issue was also sharply debated at oral argument. Transcript at 11-22, 34-43.
The Court's avoidance of this approach might be explained by reference to certain exceptions
in ADEA's application to the federal government. As Chief Justice Burger asserted, EEOC, 103
S. Ct. at 1075 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), federal law enforcement officials are exempt from the Act.
See 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1982):
A law enforcement officer or a firefighter who is otherwise eligible for immediate retire-
ment. . . shall be separated from the service on the last day of the month in which he
becomes 55 years of age or completes 20 years of service if then over the that age. The
head of the agency, when in his judgment the public interest so requires, may exempt
such an employee from automatic separation under this subsection until that employee
becomes 60 years of age.
This passage resembles Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-3-107 (1977).
In its examination of the scope of congressional power under § 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970),
the Court appeared to hold that Congress can expand the coverage of the amendment beyond the
limits set by judicial interpretation, subject only to the requirement that Congress must rationally
conclude that a given set of actions violated rights guaranteed by its broader definition of the
fourteenth amendment. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261-72 (1977). See also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1068, 1073-74. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). If the Court were to hold
that Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to § 5, the Court would be faced with the issue of
whether an act of a state can be held to violate the fourteenth amendment at the same time that an
identical act of the federal government is constitutionally permissible. It may well be that this
looming constitutional double standard persuaded the Court to avoid any recourse to § 5 and to
deal solely with the commerce-clause power.
70. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061.
71. Id at 1062.
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ute addressed attributes of state sovereignty. 72
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court reiterated that management
of state parks is a traditional state function. It emphasized that the
purpose of the Usery doctrine was to "protect States from federal intru-
sions that might threaten their 'separate and independent existence.' "-73
It reasoned, however, that the determination of direct impairment of
essential functions must depend "on considerations of degree," 74 and
undertook to determine what degree of infringment had actually oc-
curred. Justice Brennan noted that the enforcement of the ADEA
would not prevent Wyoming from achieving its articulated goal of
"'assuring the physical preparedness of Wyoming game wardens to
perform their duties.' 75 Wyoming, in the Court's view, was still free
to assess physical preparedness through individual examinations. Fur-
ther, the state could have applied its rules for mandatory retirement
without offending the ADEA if it could demonstrate that age is a bona
fide occupational qualification for park rangers.76 Therefore, the Court
held that the ADEA did not intrude sufficiently into state affairs to
render the legislation unconstitutional.
B. An Examination of the Court's Analysis.
EEOC v. Wyoming nowhere contains an explicit rejection of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's approach in Usery. The decision implicitly suggests,
however, that the Rehnquist test is no longer favored by a majority of
the Court. Justice Brennan's statement that tenth amendment viola-
tions depend on the degree of infringement reflects the Court's accept-
ance of a method for analysis which Justice Rehnquist had rejected in
Usery. In Usery, the Court had been concerned with whether any in-
fringement had occurred; 77 the degree was constitutionally irrelevant.
72. Id at 1061. The Court, while recognizing that a state's employment relationship with its
workers can often be an exercise of its sovereign core functions, as was the case in Usery, empha-
sized that it should "not be understood to suggest that every state employment decision aimed
simply at advancing a generalized interest in efficient management--even the eficient management
oftraditionalstaiefunctions--should be considered to be 'an exercise of an undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty.'" Id at 1061 n.l I (emphasis added). This language, although not directly bear-
ing on the case, suggests that the Court was intent on tightening the loosely defined parameters of
User,, a point further illustrated by the ultimate holding in the case. See infra notes 77-89 and
accompanying text.
73. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1061.
74. Id
75. Id (quoting Brief of Appellees at 18).
76. Id
77. The court even went so far as to search for infringements of social policy:
The state might wish to employ persons with little or no training, or those who wish to
work on a casual basis, or those who for some other reason do not possess minimum
employment requirements, and pay them less than the federally prescribed minimum
616 [Vol. 1984:601
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Justice Rehnquist's approach was more deferential to state con-
cerns for autonomy. His test was extraordinarily receptive to the
states's concerns and the Usery majority seemed willing to accept, at
face value, the states's claims that federal legislation would adversely
affect essential state functions.78 For instance, the Usery Court ac-
cepted the "well pleaded allegations" of the state's as accurate7 9 de-
spite claims by the Secretary of Labor that the state cost allegations
were grossly exaggerated.80 The EEOC v. Wyoming Court was less def-
erential to state claims. It rigorously examined all of the state's allega-
tions of infringement to determine their accuracy and whether the
alleged infringements were of both the degree and the quality to sup-
port the state's claim of a tenth amendment violation.
In EEOC v. Wyoming the Court seemed to reject the notion that
fiscal impact would always justify a finding that the federal legislation
impermissibly infringed on legitimate state functions. For instance, in
holding that Wyoming could achieve its goals by providing individual
physical examinations to employees over the age of fifty-five,8' the
Court refused to consider the cost increase to the state of providing
such examinations. The Court's rationale that the ADEA would not
affect the state at all if the state could prove that age was a bona fide
occupational qualification for the job in question ignored the legal costs
that the state would have to bear in defending lawsuits challenging age
as such a qualification.82 The Court also dismissed the argument that,
because older workers with seniority are paid more than younger em-
ployees, the application of the ADEA will increase the State's expendi-
tures, noting that
these increased costs, even if they were not largely speculative in
their own right, might very well be outweighed by a number of other
factors: Those same older workers, as long as they remain employed,
will not have to be paid any pension benefits at all, and will continue
to contribute to the pension fund. And, when they do retire, they will
likely, as an actuarial matter, receive benefits for fewer years than
workers who retire early.83
wage. It may wish to offer part-time or summer employment to teenagers at a figure less
than the minimum wage ....
Usery, 426 U.S. at 848 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 846.
79. Id
80. Brief for Appellee at 44-53, Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
81. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
82. Id at 1072 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id at 1063 (emphasis added). Wyoming further argued that the costs of state health and
other benefit plans would increase if extended to older workers. The Court, however, disposed of
this point by noting that 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982) provides that the ADEA shall not be inter-
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Thus, although the Court in Usery was satisfied with the possibility of
actual harmful fiscal impact, the Court in EEOC v. Wyoming seemed
unimpressed by anything other than a showing of certain and substan-
tial infringement.
That Justice Brennan deviated from the Rehnquist approach in
Usery is further illustrated by his use of the phrase "particularized as-
sessments of actual impact. '8 4 The Usery Court had used the phrase to
emphasize that the practical effects of the FLSA were not constitution-
ally relevant.85 Justice Brennan, however, asserted in EEOC v. Wyo-
ming that:
The test of such financial effect as drawn in National League of Cities
does not depend, however, on "particularized assessments of actual
impact," which may vary from State to State and time to time, but on
a more generalized inquiry, essentially legal rather than factual, into
the direct and obvious effect of the federal legislation on the ability
of the States to allocate their resources.86
In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Court used the phrase not to deemphasize
actual impact, but to introduce a broader investigation. The mere
claim by one state of an increased financial burden is no longer suffi-
cient to render federal legislation unconstitutional under the tenth
amendment. Now a state must convince the Court that the law in ques-
tion would substantially alter an essential state function.8 7
According to Usery, as interpreted by Chief Justice Burger's dis-
sent in EEOC v. Wyoming, states exercise their sovereign powers when
they decide whom to employ, as much as when they exercise control
over wages paid to their employees.88 In addition, under Usery, law
enforcement officials are considered essential to the independent exist-
ence of the states.89 Because the ADEA interferes with a state's ability
to decide whom to employ for law enforcement positions, it appeared
to violate the tenth amendment as construed in Usery. The Court's
decision to uphold the ADEA in EEOC v. Wyoming, despite the Usery
preted to require that health and other benefits received by older workers be identical to those of
younger employees. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
In order to take advantage of the provision, however, Wyoming would be required to enact
new laws and create new regulations to decrease its insurance coverage of older workers, Chief
Justice Burger maintained in dissent that "[dirafting and enacting these new laws is a burden
Congress has no power to impose on the States." Id at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
85. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
86. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
87. The Court, upon making this statement, proceeded to investigate whether the ADEA, by
increasing the number of elderly employees, would place a burden upon the state's fiscal re-
sources, and concluded that it would not. Id
88. Id at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
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holding, suggests that a majority of the Court now accept Justice Black-
mun's balancing approach in which the degree of the infringement of
state functions is constitutionally relevant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Usery doctrine represented an important step toward state
freedom from federal regulation. But its potentially revolutionary ap-
proach suffered from two weaknesses: the difficulty of applying the
holding in light of ambiguities such as "essential state functions" and
"state sovereignty," and the problem of determining the weight to be
accorded the majority opinion in view of Justice Blackmun's terse but
significant concurring opinion. In subsequent cases, the Court strug-
gled with the latter difficulty and, in Virginia Surface Mining and FERC
v. Mississippi, embraced the element of Justice Blackmun's balancing
test that focuses on the relative strength of the federal and state inter-
ests. The Court's opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming represents a continua-
tion of the Court's acceptance of this balancing approach and
establishes the constitutional relevance of the degree of infringement of
the state interests.
It is tempting to read EEOC v. Wyoming as implicitly overruling
Usery -9O The temptation is increased by the fact that Justice Brennan,
the chief dissenter in Usery,9 1 wrote the opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming.
The Usery doctrine, however, has continued vitality. The emergence of
the balancing test, it is true, will have the effect of narrowing the Usery
doctrine in that fewer infringements of essential state functions will
now be found to violate the tenth amendment. The balancing test,
however, does preserve the heart of the Usery doctrine-that the tenth
amendment restricts Congress's enumerated powers. The current com-
position of the Court further suggests that any requiem for the Usery
doctrine is premature. The Court in 1983 is as polarized on the tenth
amendment issue as it was in 1976. The Usery decision had the sup-
port of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and Stew-
art-with Justice Blackmun providing the crucial fifth vote. Dissenting
were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. In both FERC v.
Mississippi and EEOC v. Wyoming, the alliances were similar,92 with
but one significant difference-Justice Blackmun. The cases following
90. See N.Y. Times, March 3, 1983, at A19, col. 1.
91. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856-80.
92. Of course, Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart. In addition, both Justice Powell
and Justice O'Connor separately concurred in part and dissented in part in FERC v. Mississppi,
456 U.S. at 771-75 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 775-97 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Usery provide no clear indication that Justice Blackmun has altered his
view towards tenth-amendment issues. Thus, for the time being, the
resolution of tenth-amendment claims will depend on Justice Black-
mun.
Vincent Daniel Palumbo
